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[L. A. No. 25465. In Bank. Nov. 3, I!l;)!).]

JACK OWENS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; JESSIE THIELE,
Real Party in Interest.

o

[1] Process - Defects and Remedies - Motion to Quash - Man"damus.-8ince the enactment of Code Civ. Proc., §§ 416.1-416.3
in 1955, the appropriate remedy, when a trial court refuses to
quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over defendant, is a writ of mandate directing the court to
enter its order quashing service. If the facts justify such
relief it is immaterial that defendant has prayed for the wrong
remedy, such as writ of prohibition, and the Supreme Court
may treat his petition as one for writ of mandate.

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Pi"OeeSS, Notices and Papers, § 52.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Process, § 72; [2, 3, 8, 17] Process,
§ 28; [4,10] Judgments, § 7(2) j [5] Process, § 27; [6,7,9,12-16]
Process, § 33; [11] Process, § 58.1.
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[2] ld.-Service by Publication-- Construction of Statute.-Under
. Code Civ. Proc., § 417, l"f'l:1t.in~ t.o {hI' pOWf'r of courts to render
. persQnal jl.idgments against one ovp-r whom jurisdiction was
acquired on service by publication, where defendant was a
resident of Arizona at the time a personnl injury action was
commenced against him in California and at the time of personal service of summons on him in Arizona, jurisdiction must
be based on his residence in California at the time the cause
of action arose.
[31 ld. - Service by Publica.tion - Construction of Statute. - As
used in Code Civ. Proc., § 417, relating to the power of courts
to render personal judgments against one over whom jurisdiction was acquired on service by publication and who was a
resident of this state at the time the cause of action arose,
the word "resident" means "domiciliary."
[41 Judgments-Prerequisites-Judgments on Constructive or Substituted Service.-The language of Code Civ. Proc., §§ 412, 413,
declaring that a person who "resides out of the state; or has
departed from the state; or cannot, after· due diligence, be
found within the state; or conceals himself to avoid the service of summons" is subject to service by publication and that,
under such circumstances, personal service outside the state
is "equivalent to publication," is broad enough in its terms to
authorize a personal judgnlent based on extraterritorial service of process either through "pUblication" or "personal service" on a defendant outside the state.
[5] Process-Service by Publica.tion-Statutory Provisions. - The
operation of Code Civ. Proc., § 417 (as originally enacted in
1951), providing for personal service and personal judgment
against a nonresident where jurisdiction has been acquired by
publication of summons, being based on the broad authority of
§§ 412, 413, was made dependent on defendant's residence
within the st.ate at the time of commencement of the action
or at the time of service, and on his personal service with
summons. Such code provision satisfied the requirements of
procedural due process because no more certain provision for
defendant's receipt of actual notice of litigation, against him
could be made than through specified personal service of
process.
[6] ld.-Persons Who Ma.y Be Served-Nonresidents. - Though
amenability to suit in California is a responsibility growing
out of a defendant's domicile in the state, such responsibility
does not cease when such domicile ceases where the action is
commenced before defendant changes his domicile to another
state. Jurisdiction is justified by plaintiff's interest in being

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Process, Notices and Papers, § 59; Am.Jur.,
Process, § 90 et seq.
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able to conduct his litigation on the basis of thc facts existing
at the time he must act and on his filing his action where jurisdiction over defendant might be obtained; but the mere fact
of past domicile in the state would not subject defendant to
its jurisdiction indefinitely, since a past domicile having no
relationship to the litigation at hand would not afford reasoll- .
able basis for the assertion of jurisdiction.
[7] Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-Code Civ.
Proc., § 417, subd. (b), relating to the power of courts to
render personal judgments against one over whom jurisdiction
was acquired on service by publication, requires more than
past domicile in the state; there must have been domicile here
at the time the cause of action arose. Since jurisdiction so !
based rests neither on an existing relationship nor on the right
of plaintiff to rely on an existing relationship at the time he :
commences his action, it may be debatable whether such jurisdiction can constitutionally be assumed in the absence of 'some
other relevant contacts with the state.
[8), leL-Service by Publication-Construction of Statute.-Under
Stats. 1957, ch. 1674, § 2, declaring that if the 1957 amendment of Code Civ. Proc., § 417, extending the power of courts
to render personal judgments against one absent from the
state but who was domiciled in the state at the time the cause
of action arose if he was personally served with process, is held
invalid such invalidity shall not affect the provisions of § 417
as they were in force immediately prior to the effective date of
such amendment, nor affect other provisions or applications
of such amendment which can be given effect without the
invalid provision or application, and that in this respect such
amendment and its provisions "are declared to be severable,"
even if domicile alone at the time the cause of action arose
does not justify personal jurisdiction pursnant to §§ 412, 413,
other contacts with the state either alone or together with such
domicile may fully support such jurisdiction. In such a case,
the severability clause compels the court to give effect to § 417,
subd. (b), by exercising jurisdiction pursuant to its terms
where defendant was domiciled in the state at the time the
cause of action arose.
[9) Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-In an action against a defendant who was domiciled'in California at
the time a cause of action arose against him in California for
injuries sustained by plaintiff when she was bitten by defendant's dog in California, though defendant subsequently changed
his domicile to Arizona, the fact that the cause of action arose
out of defendant's activities in California, namely, his ownership and possession of the offending dog, is sufficient under the
due process clause to permit the courts of this state to assert
personal jurisdiction over him.
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[10] Judgments - Prerequisites - Judgments on Constructive or
Substituted Service.-The rule that due proce!ls requires that
in order to subject a defendant to a jUdgment in p"rSotUlm, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of
the suit does not offend against traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice, applies to individuals as well as foreign
corporations.
[11] Process - Service on Nonresident Motorists. - Jurisdiction
over nonresident motorists does not rest on consent but on
their activity in the state.
[12] Id.-Per80ns Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-Though
the problem of securing jurisdiction over persons who have
left the state where their activities gave rise to causes of action
is most acute in the case of the nonresident motorist, assumption of jurisdiction is constitutionally justified, not because
the problem is acute and often arises, but because it is reasonable and fair to require a defendant whose voluntary acts have
given rise to a cause of action in a state to litigate his responsibility for that conduct at the place where it occurred.
[13] Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-The rational basis of the decisions upholding the nonresident motorist statutes is broad enough to include the case in which the
nonresident defendant causes injury without the intervention
of any particular instrumentality. The Legislature may direct
its policy to the fact of injury as well as its probability.
[14] Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-While the
Legislature has not specifically provided for jurisdiction over
nonresidents based on the commission of a tortious act within
the state, it has provided that our courts shall have personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., §§ 412, 413, to the
extent constitutionally permissible if the conditions of § 417
have been met, and those conditions have been met where
defendant was a resident of the state at the time plaintiff was
bitten by defendant's dog in this state. The fact that the cause
of action for such injuries arose out of defendant's activities
in this state justified the assumption of jurisdiction over him
by personal service outside the state.
[15] Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-Assuming
that an activity carried on within the state Out of which n
cause of action arose must be of some peculiarly dangerous. or
serious kind to justify an assertion of jurisdiciton over a pel'son who has left the state, no such limitation exists if defendant was also domiciled in the state at the time the cause of
action arose.
[16] Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-Whl'n a
cause of action arose out of an IIctivity carried on within the

I
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state at 1\ time when defendant WIIS dOlllieilf!d here, the quality
and nature of the activity in 1·elation to the fair and orderly
administrat.ion of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
proc('ss clause t.o insure justifies subjecting def('ndant, who has
\I:'ft the state, to the jurisdiction of our courts.
[17] ld.-Service by Publication-Construction of Statute.-Code
eiv. Proc., § 417, subd. (b), extending the power of courts to
render personal judgments against one absent from the state
but who was domiciled in the state at the time the cause of
action arose if he was personally served with process, permits
entry of a personal judgment pursuant to service made after
its effective date, though defendant has established his domicile
in another state. The statute governs procedure only, since it
neither creates a new cause of action nor deprives defendant
of any defense on the merits, and defendant has no vested right
to have the jurisdiction of the courts of this state limited as
it was at the time he left the state.

(J

PROCEEDING in prohibition, treated as one in mandamus
County to enter
an order quashing service of summons. Writ denied.

to compel the Superior Court of Los Angeles
Parker, Stanbury,
for Petitioner.

R~ese

& McGee and White McGee, Jr.,

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Edward A. Nugent, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
Charles F. Legeman for Real Party in Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-In January, 1957, plaintiff (real party
in interest herein) commenced an action against defendant
(petitioner herein) to recover damages for injuries suffered
from being bitten by defendant's dog. The cause of action
arose in California when defendant was a resident here, but
before the action was commenced, defendant became a permanent resident of Arizona. In September, 1958, plaintiff
secured an order for publication of summons pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure, section 412, and defendant was personally served with summons in Arizona on September 29th.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 413.) Defendant appeared specially
and moved to quash the service of summons on the ground
that it was ineffective to give the tl'ial court juril;Jictioll ove1'
bim. The court denied his motion, and he then filed this petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent further proceedings
against him.

,
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[1] Since Code of Civil Procedure', gec~t.i(lllS 416.i-416.3,
were enacted in 1955, the appropriate remedy, when a trial
court refuses to quash service of summons 011 the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, is a writ of mandate
directiilg the court to enter its order quashing service. (Hartford v. Superior Court, 47 Ca1.2d 447, 451 [304 P.2d 1] ;
Chesin v. Superior Court, 142 Cal.App.2d 360, 362 [298 P.2<l
593] ; see 1 Witkin, California Procedure, .Turisdiction, § 81A.)
If the facts justify such relief it is immaterial that defendant has prayed for the wrong remedy, and we treat his
petition as one for a writ of mandate. (See Boren v. State
Personnel Board, 37 Ca1.2d 634, 638 [234 P.2d 981] ; 3 Witkin, California Procedure, pp. 2568-2569.)
Section 417 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"Where jurisdiction is acquired over a person who is outside of this State by publication of summons in accordance
with Sections 412 and 413, the court shall have the power
to render a personal judgment against such person only if he
was personally served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and was a resident of this State (a) at the time of the
commencement of the action, or (b) at the time that the cause
of action arose, or (c) at the time of service."
[2] Since defendant was a resident of Arizona at the
time the action was commenced and at the time of service,
jurisdiction under section 417 must be based on his residence
here at the time the cause of action arose. (Subd. (b).) [3] As
used in section 417, resident means domiciliary (Smith Y.
Smith, 45 Cal.2d 235, 240 [288 P.2d 497]), and it is not
disputed that defendant was a California domiciliary at the
time the cause of action arose. Defendant contends, however,
that this fact is not snfficient to permit the state to acquire
jurisdiction over him by personal service beyond its borders,
and that, in any event, subdivision (b) is inapplicable in this
case because it was enacted not only after the cause of action
arose and after defendant changed his domicile. to Arizona,
but after the action was commenced.
[4] In Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Ca1.2d 306 [259 P.2d
905], we considered the ei'fe('t of section 417 as it was originally
enacted in 1951. We pointed out that as "long provided by
California law, a person who' resides out of the state; or has
depal·ted from the state; or cannot, after due diligence, hI'
found within tIll' statl': or l'onl'eal~ himsf'lf to avoid thp servic'"
of slIlllmolls' i..; snhjt'..t. to seI'vice by puhlil'atioll (Code Ci\,.
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Pror-_. § 412). Under such circnmstances, personal service out
side t,he state ill declared to he 'r.ql1ivalent to publication'
(Ibid, § 413). This statntory language is literally broad
enough in its terms to authorize a personal judgment based
on the extraterritorial service of process, either through
'publication' or 'personal service' on a defendant without the
state. (See 37 Cal. L. Rev. 80, 84.)" (41 Ca1.2d at 309-310.)
We then reviewed Penll.()yer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [24 L.Ed.
565], setting forth constitutional limitations on such jurisdiction and the subsequent cases, including Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357],
and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 [66
S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057], redefining such
limitations. [5] It was against this background that the
Legislature enacted section 417, and we concluded that as
"so based on the broad authority of sections 412 and 413,
section 417 is manifestly designed to restrict the power of the
court if a personal judgment is to be entered. Thus its
operation is made dependent on defendant's residence within
the state either at the time of commencement of the action
or time of service, and on his personal service with summons." (41 Ca1.2d at 312.) We held that personal jurisdiction
could constitutionally be based on the defendant's domicile
here at the time of the commencement of the action, stating:
"One main objection to service by publication on a person
residing outside of the state is that due process requires fair
notice. This was a consideration in Milliken v. Meyer, supra,
311 U.S. 457, upholding a personal judgment against a domiciliary based on the personal service of process while absent
from the state. It was there said at page 464: 'One ... incident
of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even during
sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and
employed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent
party of the proceedings against him.' The same principle on
analogous reasoning applies where a domiciliary at the time
of the commencement of the action thereafter changes his
IItate of residence and is personally served with process in the
latter state. As a citizen of the state wherein the action was
commenced, he had certain responsibilities arising out of his
relationship to that state by reason of domicile, one of whieh
was amenability to suit therein. Such relationship and responsibility based on citizensnip within the state are not
terminated by his subsequent ~emoval to another state, and

.
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be lUay be served with process pursuant to a method reasonably designed to give him notice of the proceedings brought
against him in the courts of the state of his original domicilc
prior to his departure therefrom. We therefore conclude that
section 417 satisfies the requirements of procedural due proceSs, for no more certain provision for defendant's receipt of
actual notice of the institution of litigation against him could
be made than through the specified personal service of process.
(Milliken v. Meyer, supra, 311 U.S. 457, 463; see 40 Cal. L.
Rev. 156.) " (41 Ca1.2d at 312-313.)
[6] Defendant contends that since amenability to suit is
a responsibility growing out of domicile in the state, it ceases
when such domicile ceases. In the Allen case we held, however, that it did not cease if the action was commenced before
the defendant changed his domicile to another state. The
responsibilities arising out of domicile and its existence at
the time the action was commenced were held sufficient to
secure jurisdiction by service outside the· state although the
defendant had changed his domicile before service was made.
Such jurisdiction is justified by the plaintiff's interest in
being able to conduct his litigation on the basis of the facts
l'xisting at the time he must act. He must file his action
where jurisdiction over the defendant may be obtained. We
agree with defendant, however, that the mere fact of past
domicile in the state would not subject him to its jurisdiction
indefinitely, for a past domicile having no relationship to the
litigation at hand would not afford a reasonable basis for an
assertion of jurisdiction.
[7] Subdivision (b) of section 417 requires more than past
domicile in the state. There must have been domicile here at
the time the cause of action arose. Since jurisdiction so based
rests neither on an existing relationship nor on the right of
the plaintiff to rely on an existing relationship at the time
he commences his action, it may be debatable whether such
jurisdiction can constitutionally be assumed in the absence of
some other relevant contacts with the state. If, for example,
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were presently domiciled here and the cause of action arose out of the defendant's
activities elsewhere, the fact standing alone that the defendant
was domiciled here at the time the cause of action arose might
be too tenuous R :basis for asserting jurisdiction over him.
[8] 'l'he Legislature, anticipating such doubtful cases, provided : •• If the amendment of Section 417 of the Code of Civil

.
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Procedure, enacted at the 1957 General Session of the Legislature, or any provision thereof, or the application thereof,
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity
shall not affect the provisions of said Section 417 as they were
in force immediately prior to the effective date of said amendment nor shall it affect other provisions or applications of said
amendment which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and, to this end, and in each such
respect, said amendment and its provisions are declared to
be severable." (Stats. 1957, ch. 1674, § 2.) Accordingly, even
if domicile alone at the time the cause of action arose does not
justify personal jurisdiction pursuant to sections 412 and
413, other contacts with the state either alone or together
with such domicile may fully support such jurisdiction. In
such a case, the severability clause compels the court to give
effect to subdivision (b) of section 417 by exercising jurisdiction pursuant to its terms.
[9] In the present case the cause of action arose out of
defendant's activities in this state, namely, his mvnership
and possession of the offending dog. This fact alone is sufficient
under the due process clause to permit the courts of this state
to assert personal jurisdiction over him.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
[66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057], the court stated:
"Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment
in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a
judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 733 [24 L.Ed. 565]. But now that the capia.s ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or
other form of notice, due process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" In Henry R. Jahn ~ &m v. Superior
Court, 49 Ca1.2d 855, 860-861 [323 P.2d 437], we reviewed
the application of the minimum contacts test and pointed out:
"In some circumstances there is adequate basis for jurisdiction
when the defendant has elected to deal with the plaintiff even
though only by mail. (McGee v. Inte1'lIa"tional Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 [78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223] ; Panna-lee v.
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Iowa. Sta.!€. Tmt·rling ;Wpn'.~ A.<.<lI .• 20fl F.2d ;=;18, :122.) Again.
there is jurisdictioll when the {,RUS{, o( at"! ion arm;(' out of the
breat·1t or a contract made and to be pcrformed in the state
(Oompania. De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals 00., 205 Md. 237
[107 A.2d 357, 108 A.2d 372, 49 A.L.R.2d 646], eert. den., 3!R
U.S. 943 [75 S.Ct. 365, 99 L.Ed. 738] ; see also 8. Howes 00.
v. W. P. Milli1lg 00., (Okla) 277 P.2d 655, 657-658) or
even out of a mere isolated act in the state by the defendant
or his agent. (Nelson v. MUler, 11 Ill.2d 378 [143 N.E.2d 673] ;
Smyth v. Twin State ImprO'l.!ement Oorp., 116 Vt. 569 rSO A.2d
664, 25 A.L.R.2d 1193] ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 [47
S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091] ; Johns v. Bay State A.bmsive Products 00., 89 F. Supp. 654.)" [10] The rationale of the International Shoe case is not limited to foreign corporations, and
both its language and the cases sustaining jurisdiction over
nonresident motorists make clear that the minimum contacts
test for jurisdiction applies to individuals a.~ well as foreign
corporations. [11] It is now settled that jurisdiction over
nonresident motorists does not rest ou consent but 011 their
activity in the state. (Olberding v. Illinois Oelltl'aZ R. 00.,346
U.S. 338, 341 [74 S.Ct. 83, 98 L.Ed. 39] ; see also Doherty &'7
00. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 628 [55 S.Ct. 553, 79 L.Ed.
1097] ; Allen v. Superior Oourt, 41 Ca1.2d 306, 311-312 [259
P.2d 905].)
[12] Defendant contends, however, that the nonresident
motorists cases stand on a special footing in that a special
rule is justified by the hazards of motor vehicle operations
and the likelihood that nonresident motorists will have left
the state following accidents before service of process can
be had. It may be conceded that the problem of securing
jurisdiction over persons who have left the state where their
activities gave rise to causes of action is most acute in the
case of the nonresident motorist. Assumption of jurisdiction
is constitutionally justified, however, not because the problem
is acute and arises often, but because it is reasonable and fair
to require a defendant whose voluntary acts have given rise
to a cause of action in a state to litigate llis responsibility for
that conduct at the place where it occurred. [13] "The social
problem resulting from automobile accidents • . . may be of
greater magnitude than those resulting from other tortiOU!l
conduct generally; but the determination that the degree of
need is such as to call for remedy is to be made by the legislature and not hy the COUl'ts. The rational basis of the decisions

,
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-------------------------llpho1cling thl' nonrl'sid"ul motori.st. statutes is broad enough
10 ine)wle Ihe ('ase in whiC'h the nonresident d('fendant causes
-injury without the intcrvention oE any particnlar instrumentality. The legislature may direct its policy to the fact of
-injury as well as its probability." (Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d
378, 389 [143 N.E.2d 673].) [14] It is true that our Legis- !
lature has not specifically provided for jurisdiction over nonresidents based on the "commission of a tortious act within
this State" out of which a cause of action arose, as has the
Illinois Legislature in the statute construed in the Nelson
case. (11 Ill.2d at 381.) It ha.~ provided, however, that our
courts shall have personal jurisdiction pursuant to sections
412 and 413 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the extent constitutionally permissible if tlle conditions of section 417 are
met. The conditions of section 417 have been met in this
case, and the fact that the cause of action arose out of defendant's activities here fully justifies the assumption of
jurisdiction over him by personal service' outside the state.
[15] Even if ,ve were to assume that an activity carried
on within the state out of which the cause of action arose
must be of some peculiarly dangerous or serious kind to justify
an assertion of jurisdiction, no such limitation exists if the
defendant was also domiciled in the state at the time the cause
of action arose. [16] When, as in this case, the cause of
action arose here out of an activity carried on here at a time
when defendant was domiciled here, "the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due proces.~
clause to insure" (International Shoe 00. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 319 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057])
fully justifies subjecting defendant to the jurisdiction of our
courts. (Henry R. Jahn &- Son v. Superior Oourt, 49 Ca1.2d
855, 862 [323 P.2d 437] ; Oarl F. W. Borgward, O.M.B.H. v.
Superior Oourt, 51 Ca1.2d 72, 79 [330 P.2d 789].)
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 [78 8.0t. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d
1283], and May v. _4ndel'son, 345 U.S. 528 [73 S.Ct. 840, 97
L.Ed. 1221], are not to the contrary. In Hansf)n v. Denckla
the court did not depart from the minimum contact test but
pointed out that the defendant had done no act in the state
that would justify an assumption of jurisdiction over it. (357
U.S. at 251.) In May v. Anderson the court did not consider
whether personal jurisdiction could be based on past contacts
with the state, for it was apparently conceded that the child
(·ustody decree in question was entered withont personal jlll-is..

_,..,
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did inn nn~r the mnthl'T al111 1\11'1"1' WHS 110 st HtlltE' llut.bori7.1ng
:-;C'rvieC' oulf'iilC' t.he statc in slwh Pl·O'·PNlilll!s.
[17] There is no merit in defendant's contention that sub-

C)

division (b) is inapplicable 011 the ground that it was enacted
after the action was filed and he had established his domicile in
Arizona. Plaintiff does not rely on that subdivision to validate
a service attempted before it became effective, but to permit an
assumption of jurisdiction permitted by the !!tatute at the time
service was made. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 416.) The statute
governs procedure only, for it neither creates a new cause of
action nor deprives defendant of any defense on the merits,
and defendant has no vested right to have the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state limited as it was at the time he left the
state. Accordingly, subdivision (b) permits entry of a personal judgment pursuant to service made after its effective
date. (Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 71 [69 S.Ct. 944, 93
L.Ed. 1207] ; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 544 [69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528] ; Norton v. City
of Pomona, 5 Ca1.2d 54, 65-66 [53 P.2d 952] ; San Bernat'dino
C01('nty v. Industr'ial Acc. Com., 217 Cal. 618, 628-630 [20
P.2d 673] ; McChtrg v. McClurg, 212 Cal. 15, 18 [297 P. 27] ;
Rice v. Dunlap, 205 Cal. 133, 137 [270 P. 196]; Olivas v.
Weiner, 127 Cal.App.2d 597, 600-601 [274 P.2d 476] ; California Emp. etc. Com. v. Smilcage Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 249,
252 [156 P.2d 454] ; see Aetna Cas. &- Surety Co. v. Industrial
Ace. Com., 30 Cal.2d 388, 393-395 [182 P.2d 159]; Allen v.
SuperWr Court, 41 Cal.2d 306, 313 [259 P.2d 905].)
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ
denied.
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., Peters, J., aud Peek, J. pro tem.,·
concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would issue the peremptory
writ of mandate directing respondent court to vacate its order
denying petitioner's motion to quash service of summons and
to enter its order grauting the motion, for the reasons stated
by Mr. Justice Nourse in the opinion prepared by him for
the District Court of Appeal in Owe11s v. Supef"ior Court (Cal.
App.), 338 P.2d 465.
Schauer, J., concurred .
• As~jglled by Chninn:t11 of Judicial
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